Military Leaders From Germany

"A man is born, and not made, a strategist."

"The modern commander-in-chief is no Napoleon who stands with his brilliant suite on a hill. Even with the best binoculars he would be unlikely to see much, and his white horse would be an easy target for innumerable batteries. The commander is farther to the rear in a house with roomy offices, where telegraph and wireless, telephone and signalling instruments are at hand, while a fleet of automobiles and motorcycles, ready for the longest trips, wait for orders. Here, in a comfortable chair before a large table, the modern Alexander overlooks the whole battlefield on a map. From here he telephones inspiring words, and here he receives the reports from army and corps commanders and from balloons and dirigibles which observe the enemy's movements and detect his positions."

"Der Angriff gegen die Flanke ist der wesentlichste Inhalt der ganzen Kriegsgeschichte."

"The principles of strategy remain unchanged. The enemy's front is not the objective. The essential thing is to crush the enemy’s flanks...and complete the extermination by attack upon his rear."

"A victory on the battlefield is of little account if it has not resulted either in breakthrough or encirclement. Though pushed back the enemy will appear again on different ground to renew the resistance he momentarily gave up. The campaign will go on."

"When you march into France, let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve."

"It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong."

"Um zu siegen, müssen wir versuchen, an der Stelle des Zusammenstoßes die Stärkeren zu sein. Dazu haben wir aber nur Aussicht, wenn wir die Operation bestimmen, nicht wenn wir in passiver Aufstellung abwarten, was der Feind über uns beschlossen hat."

"Political morality differs from individual morality, because there is no power above the state."

"The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things recognize this one fact—that success is necessary to gain influence over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to prepare their minds to it...We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the sword."

"He felt that the ‘halt’ had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the British Army had been captured at Dunkirk, the British people might have felt that their honour had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate them."

"Hitler... gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wanted to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain."

"All equipment of the [[British Army|[British] expeditionary force]] was lost, and we knew that there were few reserves of men and materiel in the homeland. Never in modern times had Britain been in a more critical situation. Only a man like Winston Churchill could have brought the country through such a crisis. We had no plans for an invasion and no equipment and specially trained forces with which to undertake the invasion. Hence the delay, the hesitation, and finally Hitler’s decision not to risk it. Whether we should have risked it is of course now only a matter of historical interest. Admiral Wagner, with whom I have discussed this question recently and who was then chief of Naval Operations, is of the opinion that it would have failed. I think it could have been done. Militarily, this was for us one of the lost opportunities of the war. With regard to the air attack in August and September [1940]—the Battle of Britain—I can speak only from the standpoint of the army. It was not thought possible to conquer Britain from the air. The objective was to destroy British air power and gain control of the air. This failed. English aircraft were greater in number than estimated or Britain’s production was higher than estimated. By the middle of September it was obvious that the attack against London would not be decisive. Our losses in aircraft from improved flank and other defense measures became too high in proportion to results achieved. The air attacks were then switched to new objectives—the production and armament plants became targets with a view of knocking out or delaying British rearmament. But in my opinion these were only substitute objectives fixed after the failure to achieve the first main objective—to destroy the British air power and gain control of the air over London and the south coast."

"I always felt that I was walking a tightrope with a noose around my neck."

"The original timetable called for the launching of the campaign in May [1941], with the objectives to be reached in five months—that is, in October. But the campaign did not begin until late June, bringing the terminal date into November. Originally, Hitler, the C in C, and the chief of the general staff agreed that wherever they stood in November, they would close down operations. However, they gambled with the weather, which in the late autumn was favorable, just as it was to Napoleon in 1812, and kept saying, ‘We can risk it’. Then came the bitter weather, and the German armies started to retreat."

"When Moscow was... almost in sight, the mood both of commanders and troops changed. With amazement and disappointment we discovered in late October and early November that the beaten Russians seemed quite unaware that as a military force they had almost ceased to exist. During these weeks enemy resistance stiffened. ... Marshal Zhukov had now assumed command. ... For weeks his men had been constructing a defensive position in depth. ... Skilfully camouflaged strong points, wire entanglements and thick minefields now filled the forests which covered the western approaches to Moscow."

"Hitler had read a lot of military literature. ... In this way, coupled with his personal experience of the last war as an ordinary soldier, he had gained a very good knowledge of the lower level of warfare—the properties of the different weapons; the effect of ground and weather; the mentality and morale of troops. He was particularly good in gauging how the troops felt. ... On the other hand he had no idea of the higher strategical and tactical combinations. He had a good grasp of how a single division moved and fought, but he did not understand how armies operated. ... He had a real flair for strategy and tactics, especially for surprise moves, but he lacked a sufficient foundation of technical knowledge to apply it properly. Moreover, he had a tendency to intoxicate himself with figures and quantities. When one was discussing a problem with him, he would repeatedly pick up the telephone, ask to be put through to some departmental chief, and ask him — ‘How many so and so have we got?’ Then he would turn to the man who was arguing with him, quote the number, and say: ‘There you are’ — as if that settled the problem."

"As far as winter preparations were concerned, measures had been taken by the supply services, but they were inadequate. Clothing was prepared for a hard German winter, but it was inadequate for a severe Russian winter. The transport failed because German locomotives were not equipped for extremely low temperatures. Moreover the Russians in their retreat destroyed all the water tanks and this created enormous difficulties in train operations. The campaign should have been halted earlier and necessary measures taken to hold the positions already taken."

"The first plan for an offensive campaign [in the West] was formulated in November 1939. In substance it was a repetition of the 1914 Schlieffen plan. As the start of the campaign was delayed, doubts arose as to the achievement of any surprise with this plan. The basic idea of the new plan—the breakthrough in the Ardennes, crossing of the Meuse, and the trapping of British, French and Belgian forces in the north by pushing the tank forces through to the Channel—came to several minds at once. And in justice it should be said that one of these was Hitler’s. However, General Manstein, then chief of staff to Marshal Rundstedt, deserves the greater credit. He worked out the plan and proposed its adoption. The order was given to the Operations Division in February 1940 to replan the campaign along the proposed lines. From February 1940 to May 1940 the plan was subject to the sharpest criticism. Among the critics was General Guderian, who described the plan as a ‘crime against Panzers’. General Halder deserves the credit for defending the plan against all critics and insisting upon its execution. General Bock was also opposed to it and appealed to the chief of the general staff. Halder said once that he would stick to the plan if the chances of succeeding were only ten percent."

"When the German armies began to retreat, Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch and personally took command. He always maintained thereafter that he personally saved the German army from the fate that had overtaken Napoleon’s forces in the retreat from Moscow."

"At the very beginning of the offensive, the piercing of the forward Russian lines, deeply and heavily mined as they were, had proved much more difficult than we anticipated. The terrific Russian counterattacks, with masses of men and material ruthlessly thrown in, were also an unpleasant surprise. German casualties had not been light, while our tank losses were staggering. The Panthers did not come up to expectations; they were easily set ablaze, the oil and gasoline feeding systems were inadequately protected, and the crews were insufficiently trained. Of the 80 Panthers available when battle was joined only a few were left on 14 July [1943]."

"When the Russians were found to be concentrating for an attack, I withdrew my troops from the first line under cover of night to the second line—usually about 2 kilometres behind. The result was that the Russian blow hit the air, and its further attack did not have the same impetus."

"It was like hitting an empty bag. The Russian attack would lose its speed because my men, unharmed, would be ready. Then my troops on sectors that had not been attacked would close in and reoccupy the original front lines."

"In 1939 Hitler assured Brauchitsch that England and France would not declare war when Germany moved against Poland. The general staff expected a war of two or three months’ duration. After France and England declared war, the opinion was that it would last a long time, but no definite time was predicted. Both Brauchitsch and the chief of the general staff had grave doubts as to Germany’s ability to conduct a prolonged struggle. In the general planning it was estimated that we would require a four months’ reserve of armaments and munitions to carry through the period of conversion to war production. At the outbreak of the war, however, we had only a two months’ reserve. This gap was bridged during the inactive period of the war between the Polish and western campaigns."

"Within the next few days Marshal Zhukov was to launch the great Russian counteroffensive which began on December 6th. ... The turning point in the East had been reached: our hopes of knocking Russia out of the war in 1941 had been dashed."

"He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. ... He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. ... He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept."

"Then the weather suddenly broke and almost overnight the full fury of the Russian winter was upon us. The thermometer suddenly dropped to thirty degrees of frost. This was accompanied by heavy falls of snow. Within a few days the countryside presented the traditional picture of a Russian winter."

"In professional circles the following were the most highly regarded: Beck, Halder, Manstein, Heinrich Stulpnagel, Fritzsche, and Brauchitsch. Also Rundstedt, although he was not as active in the War Ministry. General Beck was undoubtedly the greatest spirit in the general staff. However, he was always of the opinion that war would be a catastrophe and in this opinion he found a great friend in General Gamelin. In the general staff we always said that General Halder and General Manstein had received ‘the necessary two drops of the wisdom of Solomon’. In the top level of the general staff, Manstein was regarded as the ablest and most original planner. That is also my opinion. However, there was no Schlieffen."

"Hitler always tried to make us fight for every yard, threatening to court-martial anyone who didn’t. No withdrawal was officially permitted without his approval—even a small-scale withdrawal. This principle was so hammered into the army that it was a common saying that battalion commanders were afraid ‘to move a sentry from the window to the door’."

"The German defeat in the East was, in my opinion, due to one main reason—that our troops were compelled to cover immense spaces without the flexibility, in the command, that would have enabled them to concentrate on holding decisive points. Thus they lost the initiative permanently."

"Every soldier outside Moscow knew that this was a battle for life or death. ... In 1941 the choice for the Germans was only to hold fast or to be annihilated."

"The general staff was of the opinion that a French attack in the west would have broken through, as our fortifications were not complete, nor were they in 1939, when the French could have broken through, although at heavier cost. The West Wall was completed only from Trier south to the Rhine in 1939. Northward it was incomplete and without any depth. After 1940 construction ceased. To a certain extent the West Wall was a bluff, like the Atlantic Wall. With regard to the latter it was impossible to fortify the entire coast and every military man must have concluded that a landing and a penetration of five kilometers would end all difficulties as far as fortifications were concerned."

"The battle of Moscow was the first major German defeat on land during the Second World War. It marked the end of the Blitzkrieg technique which had won Hitler and his Wehrmacht such spectacular victories. ... It was in Russia that the first fatal decisions were taken. From the political point of view, perhaps the most fatal of all had been the decision to attack that country in the first place. ... Many of our leaders had grossly underestimated the new enemy. This was partly due to ignorance. ... Several of our responsible senior officers had never campaigned in the East, having spent the whole of the First World War on the Western Front, and had no idea of the difficulties presented by the terrain nor of the toughness of the Russian fighting man. They chose to ignore the warnings of the experts."

"I don't think the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe means that there will not be other attempts to do what we did. The systems that are now in place are not solving people's economic, social and environmental problems. Other ways have to be found. New social structures will emerge, including some that embrace the socialist principles I believe in. After all, what good are moral privileges if you are poor and starving?"

"While the wall was standing, there was peace. Today there’s hardly a place that isn’t in flames. The wall was our protection – it was fantastic for me to be part of it."

"I deplore the fact that East Germans were shot while trying to flee westward, but the Berlin wall served a useful purpose. It contributed to a polarization between the two blocs, but it also gave a certain stability to their relationship."

"Sure, I hear about the new freedom that people are enjoying in Eastern Europe. But how do you define freedom? Millions of people in Eastern Europe are now free from employment, free from safe streets, free from health care, free from social security. What is happening to people in the former Soviet Union is a catastrophe. Even without idealizing what they had before, you have to admit that it was a lot better than what they have now."

"On some matters I cannot change my position. I refuse to sacrifice my Communist beliefs to the fashion of the day. I am and remain a believer in democratic centralism and a revolutionary socialist party."

"Maybe not every detail of what the Stasi did was correct, but you can say that about any secret service. Their job is to deal with people who threaten the country's sovereignty and independence. That's what the Stasi did."

"Heinz Kessler, a former East German defense minister who was later convicted of incitement to manslaughter for upholding the shoot-to-kill policy at the communist country's border, has died. He was 97. ... Kessler was arrested in May 1991 after officials in reunited Germany ... received a tip that he would try to flee the country wearing a Red Army uniform. ... In 1993, he was sentenced to 7 ½ years in prison. The case went as far as the European Court of Human Rights, which in 2001 upheld Kessler's conviction"

"Ein Keyser sey niemand underthan als Gott und der Gerechtigkeit."

"French generals must be regarded as comparatively young and bodily active, intelligent, energetic, experienced in war and well adapted for it, though but a few have, so far, shown themselves unusually clever and well acquainted with the handling of large bodies of troops, and though neither the Crimean nor the Italian war have developed any extraordinary military genius."

"On the whole, the French officer is intelligent and eager for war; he knows what he is about, and—especially under fire—he knows how to act on his own responsibility, and how to excite the men by the example of his own bravery. Add to this—for the majority of them—a good deal of campaigning and fighting experience, and we must say that they are possessed of qualities which place them very high in their profession."

"He is a man of very high standing in the Prussian army, where he has particularly distinguished himself by revolutionising the old pedantic system of teaching the soldier skirmishing, patrolling, outpost, and light infantry duty generally. His new method is now introduced in that army. It is remarkable for doing away with all pedantry of forms, and exclusively appealing to the intellectual resources of the soldier in the performance of a duty which can only be carried out well by the intelligent and harmonious co-operation of a number of men."

"All these good military qualities which urge on the French soldier to advance impetuously, show their brilliant effects only so long as you allow him to advance. The sentiment individuel, which is at the root of all his qualifications for attack, has its great disadvantages too. The soldier, being principally busied with himself, goes along with the mass as long as it advances successfully; but if this mass be forcibly, and, perhaps, unexpectedly, made to retire, its cohesion, the connection of every individual with his comrade, is soon severed, and the more so as, in such a case, the careless tactical training of the troops renders all steadiness impossible, and leads to confusion and utter dissolution."

"The French soldier follows his officers eagerly and willingly into battle, but only so long as these officers are in front of him, and literally lead him on."

"War is the life-element of an army."

"Of great bodily and mental mobility—which, however, is often enough increased to a continuous restlessness—the French soldier is indefatigable and persevering in battle, as well as in hard work of all kinds."

"The puzzle is why [France's] heavy losses did not lead to a complete collapse - as had happened in 1870 and would happen again in 1940. Some credit must certainly go to the imperturbable French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, and particularly to his ruthless purge of senescent or incompetent French commanders as the crisis unfolded. Fundamentally, however, time was against Moltke for the simple reason that the French could redeploy more swiftly than the Germans could advance once they had left their troop trains. On August 23 the three German armies on Moltke's right wing constituted twenty-four divisions, facing just seventeen and a half Entente divisions; by September 6 they were up against forty-one. The chance of a decisive victory was gone, if it had ever existed. At the Marne, the failure of Moltke's gamble was laid bare. He himself suffered a nervous breakdown."

"The Germans were not, as the phrase 'more or less' makes clear, optimistic. Moltke himself had warned the Kaiser as early as 1906 that the next war would be 'a long wearisome struggle' which would 'utterly exhaust our own people, even if we are victorious'. 'We must prepare ourselves', he wrote in 1912, 'for a long campaign, with numerous tough, protracted battles.' He was just as gloomy when he discussed the issue with his Austrian counterpart, Franz Conrad von Hôtzendorff, in May 1914: T will do what I can. We are not superior to the French.' In any case, 'The sooner the better' was not the watchword of Moltke alone. His Russian counterpart, Yanushkevich, threatened to 'smash his telephone' after the Tsar had finally approved general mobilization, to avoid the risk of being told of a royal change of heart."