1978

"Younger people identify with the Red Brigades; they are admired. The neurotics are both astonished and admiring. For the psychotics, it is a little more complex, as it is for the paranoids. But the neurotic’s astonishment and admiration are directed at someone who had the courage to do what he had long fantasised about. He took the leap."

"The Italian state has passed this difficult test with honor, but the judiciary and law enforcement agencies have revealed, in their actions, a disheartening inefficiency that allowed the Red Brigades to operate with mocking arrogance. The blame lies not so much with the police as with those who, out of demagoguery, to please the left, or to gain easy popularity, sought to dismantle the secret services, remove the most dutiful officials, and turn prisons into dormitories with daily leave. The subversives of democracy and the opponents of the law were able to preach and wreak havoc unhindered. We hope not to see them now hypocritically joining in mourning for a crime for which they are, ideologically if not materially, jointly responsible. Theirs were not merely words. A young man blown to pieces by a bomb on the Trapani-Palermo railway—the incident occurred yesterday—belonged to Democrazia Proletaria. The bandits who raided a department store in Bologna came from the Student Movement. It is pointless for these groups to now feign consternation and astonishment at the savage acts of the Red Brigades. Terrorism is their own creation."

"Upon the announcement of Aldo Moro’s death, the unions sprang into action, organizing demonstrations and calling for a general strike. We are certain of their profound condemnation and their sincere participation in the national mourning. We believe, however, that workers and their representatives would make a more constructive contribution to the fight against terrorists by keeping a close eye on factory extremists, who are all too often protected and defended. Likewise, the “committed” students, if they truly wish to distance themselves from the Red Brigades, must expel from their ranks the delusional agitators and bombers who hide Molotov cocktails and weapons in the basements of the faculties. Those who turned a blind eye to the “escalation” of violence in recent years should keep their eyes closed today so as not to shed crocodile tears."

"We believed that the assassination of Aldo Moro, as it was carried out, was the height of infamy. We had to change our minds. At the protest rally held in Piazza Duomo in Milan immediately after the macabre discovery in Via Caetani in Rome, a group of ultras shouted: “Moro, fascist!” We prefer the fangs of wild beasts to the drool of jackals."

"I believe that the best tribute one can pay to Moro is to put the episode that marked his end behind us—an episode from which, let’s be honest, his image emerges far from favorable. When I hear that, in addition to the known ones, there are other letters from Moro, I pray to God that they are never found. I already know what they contain, and I prefer not to read them."

"The Moro Case must be a subject of reflection at all times because it serves as a benchmark for our democracy and a constant warning not to lower our guard against all the dangers that might call it into question."

"Io scrivo a voi, uomini delle Brigate Rosse: restituite alla libertà, alla sua famiglia, alla vita civile, l'onorevole Aldo Moro [...] Io non ho alcun mandato nei suoi confronti, né sono legato da alcun interesse privato verso di lui. Ma lo amo come membro della grande famiglia umana, come amico di studi, e a titolo tutto particolare, come fratello di fede e come figlio della Chiesa di Cristo. [...] vi prego in ginocchio, liberate l'onorevole Moro, semplicemente, senza condizioni, non tanto per motivo della mia umile e affettuosa intercessione, ma in virtù della sua dignità di comune fratello in umanità."

"We have been faithful allies of the U.S. and the Atlantic World, but we have also had the courage to express opinions, perspectives, and concerns: after all, Moro was an example. The lessons we learn from the past help us understand how to handle situations today. We have always discussed the relationship between Moro and the PCI’s entry into the government. And the major clash is the Mediterranean, a geopolitical issue that erupts and involves the conflict, for example, between Moro and Kissinger."

"One can evade the Italian police—the Italian police as they are trained, organized, and directed—but not the laws of probability. And according to statistics released by the Ministry of the Interior regarding police operations conducted during the period from Moro’s kidnapping to the discovery of his body, the Red Brigades did indeed evade the laws of probability. Which is plausible, but cannot be true and real."

"I don’t want to attack Andreotti, for heaven’s sake, but how can we forget that he handed the state over to P2 by appointing Grassini, Santovito, and Pelosi as heads of the secret services in 1978? All of them from P2. The three who later conducted the investigation into the Moro murder."

"May had descended upon Rome with all the fury of its fading spring. But it was a strange May. A sad one. In a city suspended in a soundproofed anguish, as if under a shower of polystyrene. In a city trapped beneath one of those glass cases where old people keep an image of the Virgin Mary. Or of a Christ with a bleeding heart and the face of Aldo Moro. Scialoja dreamt of Aldo Moro. Millions of Italians dreamt of Aldo Moro. His colleagues dreamt of Aldo Moro. They dreamt of meeting the same fate as the five martyrs of Via Fani."

"[In 2016] There were nine of them on Via Fani, as Morucci says, including four gunmen; they faced a security police that I don’t believe was incapable of defending Moro. So one wonders how they managed it? My comrades told me, "We did it ourselves, by training in the courtyard at home.""

"[Speech delivered on 16 March 1978, on the occasion of the general strike following the ambush] But on this day of mourning, a dramatic moment in the life of the nation, on this day the turmoil of emotions must not overwhelm us; we must oppose inhuman violence with reason, with the resolute determination not to bow to the blackmail of the murderers, the enemies of democracy and the freedom of our country. There is talk of civil war. We have known such things, but in this case we are not facing a struggle between one, albeit small, section of the people against another. That is not the case. We are facing a handful of professional terrorists who are waging a relentless campaign against our institutions and our freedoms; we are facing a small group of murderers who are attacking the institutions of Italian democracy; it is true, however, it is true and we must take advantage of this circumstance to reflect on this reality: that surrounding this tiny, ferocious gang of criminals there is a certain stratum of acquiescent, passive people, people who, if nothing else, morally disengage or even show solidarity with the criminals, with the terrorists, or who simply stand by and watch. This is not the time to stand by and watch, friends of Rome. We cannot, at this moment, in this trial, stand by passively in the face of the torment being inflicted upon our country’s institutions, democracy, freedom, and the fundamental values of civil coexistence that we have won through our struggle."

"[In 1990, "was the Via Fani operation launched that day partly to influence the parliamentary vote, or not?"] No, the coincidence of the government's formation was entirely accidental. It was no coincidence that that operation was part of a proposal that was a complete alternative to those who believed that development in Italy was linked to a political change, called "National Solidarity". That, yes, that was no coincidence because the project was being launched at that very moment, in those weeks, in those months. Certainly a project that would have brought great trouble to our country."

"[In 2000] My view remains the same as that which I expressed in my Giornale the day after the incident. "If the State, bowing to blackmail, deals with the violence that has already left the five bodies of the security police on the pavement, thereby recognising the crime as its legitimate interlocutor, it no longer has any reason, as a State, to exist". This was the position we took from day one and which, fortunately, found two resolute supporters in Parliament (Berlinguer’s PCI and La Malfa's PRI) and one reluctant supporter amidst tears and sobs (the DC of the Moro-supporting Zaccagnini). This was the "plot" that led to the State’s hesitant ‘no’, to Moro’s subsequent death, but shortly afterwards also to the surrender of the Red Brigades. As for the gossip and suspicions that have been spun around it, and which still resurface from time to time, not a shred of evidence has ever been produced, and they are merely the fruit of the whingeing infantilism of this spineless people, incapable even of conceiving that a State might react, as a State, to those who flout its laws."

"[In 2023, "on 16 March 1978, you passed through Via Fani shortly before the ambush on Aldo Moro and his security policec?"] I had to catch the bus to university; my moped was broken. I stopped at the newsagent’s to pick up the Messaggero. I was reading the front-page news about Juventus managing to beat Ajax thanks to Zoff, when the gunfire started. I ran to the opposite side of the street and, with a neighbour, we hid in a side alley. It didn’t last long. When I went back, there were victims on the ground, bullet casings, blood. It looked like a film. But I realised the gravity of the situation at home: there was nothing else on the telly."

"[In April 1978, while Moro was still alive, albeit in the hands of the Red Brigades] Firmness is therefore justified. But it will be even more justified if accompanied by concrete signs indicating that the State, in whose name this rigor is invoked and exercised, wishes to renew itself."

"Even the P2 wanted Moro dead because he was opening the door to the PCI. And Cossiga was powerless."

"When, with Berlinguer’s PCI, I opted for the line of firmness, I was certain and aware that, barring a miracle, we had condemned Moro to death. Others turned out to be negotiators later on; the Moro family, moreover, took it out only on me, never on the communists. The point is that, unlike many social Catholics, who are convinced that the state is a superstructure of civil society, I was and remain convinced that the state is a value. For Moro, this was not the case: the dignity of the state, as he wrote, was not worth the interest of his grandson Luca."

"The Moro Case continues to live on with its mysteries. The real ones and those artfully created. Whether and when a foreign hand was involved in that affair, no one has ever managed to prove it."

"Bettino Craxi, from an interview by Augusto Minzolini, Per me c'è un'altra lista, La Stampa, 13 October 1999."

"I truly believe the Moro case was the turning point. A leader who was opening up to the communists held captive for 55 days—where could that happen? And then the handling of the manhunt for the kidnappers... the ruse of the séance to pinpoint the hideout where they were holding him... the negotiations involving the Mafia..."

"On the afternoon of the following day, Moro was found in Via Caetani. Some said he had been dumped there deliberately between Botteghe Oscure and Piazza del Gesù. Everyone had to realise that this marked the end of the historic compromise between Catholics and Communists. Scialoja pushed his way through the crowd, waving his press card amidst the dismay, anger and grief. In the boot of the red Renault lay a shrivelled body. This is patricide, thought Scialoja. They shot the old father; they looked him in the eyes as he died. This is patricide. A father’s blood always falls upon his children. That gaunt, bony, bird-like face; that unkempt grey beard had reminded him of his father in the coffin."

"As long as the organization is active, we cannot ask former members to recount what happened, naming the key figures involved."

"I had serious doubts about the Moro kidnapping. I set them aside, thinking of our comrades in prison who were pushing for action."

"[On the decision to kill Aldo Moro at the first sign of a possible opening by the institutions] Because they feared that the opening would be minimal, but sufficient to split the Red Brigades between those who were in favor of the killing and those who were not."

"It is shameful that even today the Christian Democrats are still criticized for the one occasion on which, by sacrificing their leader, they demonstrated the very sense of duty to the state that they have always been accused of lacking. What, in fact, was Moro asking for? In those letters, the “distinguished statesman”—the man who had governed the country for over thirty years—demanded that the state renounce the principles upon which it is founded, its laws, and its institutions, all to save his own skin."

"In any case, the government, led by Andreotti, and the Christian Democrats, with the decisive support of the Communist Party, decided to say no to the blackmail of the Red Brigades and Aldo Moro. And it was the only path to follow. [...] The very survival of the state was at stake. What would the Red Brigades have done if the government had yielded to the blackmail? They would have kidnapped the first Mr. Rossi who came within their reach and started all over again. A downward spiral would have begun, at the bottom of which lay only the dissolution of the state and the victory of the terrorists."

"In any case, if there could have been any doubt about the “line of firmness” at the time the events unfolded, such doubt is no longer valid today. It is no coincidence, in fact, that terrorism began to lose ground precisely after the Moro case and dissolved within a few years. This proves that the line of firmness was right not only from an ethical and legal standpoint but also from a practical one. If we had listened to Craxi, Mancini, Signorile, Pace, Liguori, and Deaglio, that is, to the entire faction that flirted with terrorism, today Renato Curcio would be the master of the country."

"There are countless gray areas. Several parliamentary commissions have been established, and even within these, there are gray areas. There appear to be extremely serious failures on the part of the state, and it is impossible to accept that the state could have been so inefficient. This leads one to believe that, rather than state inefficiency, there was “deliberate” inefficiency—and as such, in effect, complicity."

"We were in favor of negotiations, Renato wanted to stay out of it, but we knew that if they killed Moro, they would kill us in prison too; that’s why we took turns in the cell with Curcio, since we believed he would be the first to meet that fate."

"We wanted the closure of Asinara as a starting point for negotiating the release. We wanted the same approach as in the Sossi kidnapping, which for us had been a political victory."

"Probably, if the State had released someone—someone who was ill—I cannot guarantee today that this would have saved Moro, but it certainly would have put those handling the case in serious difficulty. This was, in fact, in my opinion, the only possibility that could have saved Aldo Moro’s life."

"Despite the jokes made, time and again, I can only repeat: it is historically proven that Moro is our doing. That is why we were convicted. The Mafia has nothing to do with it, the secret services have nothing to do with it. The latter may have intervened, but to manipulate the parties and parliament, certainly not us."

"Prospero Gallinari, from a meeting with Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio; quoted in Gallinari su Moro: "Sono in pace con lui, eravamo in guerra", lettera43.it, October 1993."

"The Red Brigades had shown themselves to be resolute and efficient, but theirs was not a victory. The decision to kill Moro created serious dissent within their ranks, whilst outside there was a deep sense of revulsion at what they had done. It is generally recognised that the crisis of Italian terrorism began with the killing of Moro. With hindsight, it therefore seems fair to acknowledge that the champions of intransigence were right: had Moro been exchanged for one or more terrorists in prison, the Red Brigades would have appeared both invulnerable and willing to compromise, with the result that their appeal would almost certainly have grown. [...] After Moro’s death, Italian democracy not only defended itself but was strengthened."

"L'uccisione di Moro è avvenuta per mano delle Brigate Rosse, ma anche e soprattutto per il volere di Giulio Andreotti, Francesco Cossiga e del sottosegretario Nicola Lettieri."

"Cossiga was advised by a man sent by the US and by a commission made up largely of P2 members. All people who, in my view, wanted things to go a different way from what all honest people were calling for. Moro had to be destroyed politically and physically: had Moro survived, Italian politics would have taken a different course from the one it did. I believe Moro could have been freed had all the institutions worked towards that end. But the formation of a government, supported by Moro and comprising communists and Christian Democrats, was opposed both by the US and, for other reasons, by the former Soviet Union."

"There is talk of civil war. We have experienced them, but in this case we are not facing the struggle of even a small part of a people against another part. That is not the case. We are facing a handful of professional terrorists who are waging a relentless war against our institutions and our freedoms; we are facing a small group of murderers who are attacking the institutions of Italian democracy."

"History—nor even current events—is made with “ifs.” But it is legitimate to speculate on what might have happened if the Red Brigades, instead of obeying the lust for destruction and death—the very lust that led a militant to dream of the advent of a Pol Pot-style regime, with a massive and salvific bloodbath—had freed Moro: that Moro who had showered his party friends with accusations and recriminations, who had renounced the Christian Democrats, who would have reemerged from the catacomb-like seclusion of Via Montalcini brimming with resentment and eager for cold, calculated revenge. For the Christian Democrats, his presence would have been disruptive, if not devastating. The martyr who had escaped death could have become—as his wife and children would eventually become—the worst enemy of the Christian Democratic Nomenklatura. Forget Cossiga (the Cossiga of 1991, to be clear)."

"The die is cast. And it is cast not only for Moro, to whom we extend our deepest and most respectful sympathy. It is also cast for a “Belle Époque” style of politics, which Moro’s destruction—whether physical or moral—brings to a close. History is regaining its tragic character, and it compels those who make it—or aspire to, or delude themselves into thinking they make it—to conform to the script. We are entering one of those “Iron Ages” in which power is paid for, or can be paid for with iron. No one is obliged to take this risk. Those who do so should know that today it was Moro’s turn; tomorrow it may be theirs. Only if it realizes this and accepts it will the political class find the strength to close the Moro case. And it is time for it to do so."

"The end of Aldo Moro leaves us appalled; the fanaticism of those who killed him slowly, robbing him of hope before taking his life, fills us with horror. We still hope that the arrogance of these criminals will one day be punished. What matters now is that the country, precisely to pay tribute to Moro and in his memory, learn the bitter lesson this tragedy entails. Democracy must not—indeed, cannot—be weak. Freedom, which makes it superior to any other regime but also more vulnerable, must not be compromised by leniency toward enemies, short-sightedness, or carelessness."

"A situation in Asia that was not without considerable promise for the USA was to become far more threatening in 1979. The overthrow, in the face of mass-demonstrations, of the Shah of Iran, who left Tehran on 16 January 1979, and his replacement by a theocratic state hostile to the USA, combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 to create a highly volatile situation that posed problems for analysts. There was the prospect, first, that the USA might lose the struggle for regional hegemony and, secondly, that this might have wider consequences across Asia. Although authoritarian and prone to initiatives that were not always welcome, Iran was America’s leading ally in South Asia, an opponent to Arab radicalism, and a block to Soviet expansionism and that of Iraq, a key Soviet ally. The USA had used Iran to support the Kurds against Iraq, and, in 1973, to send troops to help the Sultan of Oman overcome left-wing rebels based in the region of Dhofar, rebels backed by Communist powers. Iran was also a major purchaser of American arms, and a key oil exporter. Under the Shah, it had long played a central role in the forward containment of the Soviet Union, not least by providing important radar bases to screen the southern Soviet Union. After the collapse of Iran, the Americans fell back upon Israel."

"Animosity toward the shah and the intensification of Iranian nationalism, aroused by the perception of the shah’s regime as an instrument of foreign imperialism and moral corruption, united otherwise incompatible groups into a powerful revolutionary alliance. In the course of one year, 1978, the monarchy was swept away. Among the contending revolutionary forces, religious leaders possessed a greater cultural affinity with Iran’s masses and better access to extensive social networks for mobilizing large numbers of people than any other component of the anti-shah coalition. The result was a startling innovation in the history of world governments—the creation of the Islamic Republic."

"Global arrogance, is not satisfied with the Islamic Revolution's success because it is quite aware of the fact that our victory would result in the globalization of Islam."

"I admit that I called it wrong really from the beginning and in the direction that it went. The direction that it went -- this rather harsh and brutal and intolerant direction that it went -- certainly surprised me. I didn't expect it. Nor did I expect that we and the Iranians would remain estranged for as long as we have."

"There is an irony lodged deep in the heart of the revolution that turned Iran from a Persian kingdom into an Islamic theocracy, a revolution cheered and organized by secular leftists and Islamist modernists. The irony is that the Iran of the fundamentalist ayatollahs owes its ultimate birth pang to cities of sin and freedom: Beirut, capital of Arabic modernity, once known as the Paris of the Middle East; and Paris, birthplace of the Age of Enlightenment. If not for the permissive freedoms in both, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—a patient man with a cunning mind—might have died forgotten in a two-story mudbrick house down a narrow cul-de-sac in the holy city of Najaf, in Iraq. The Iranian cleric had agitated against the shah of Iran for over a decade and spent time in prison in Tehran. He was sent into exile and arrived in Najaf in 1965, where he languished in anonymity for thirteen years, popular among his circle of disciples but shunned by most of the Iraqi Shia clergy. In Najaf, clerics stayed out of politics and disapproved of the firebrand ayatollah who thought he had a special relationship with God. Outside the cities that busied themselves with theology, there were those who saw in Khomeini a useful political tool, someone who could rouse crowds in the battle against oppression. Different people with different dreams, from Tehran to Jerusalem, from Paris to Beirut, looked to Khomeini and saw a man who could serve their agenda, not realizing they were serving his."

"Sexappeal hat so viel mit Selbstsicherheit und Lebendigsein zu tun."

""Männliche Sexualität gilt als schmutzig, und die weibliche wird gleich ganz verboten"

"Kraft, Schönheit und Jugend gelten als Leistungsmerkmale. Leute, die so reden, wollen am liebsten den Körper abschaffen. Den menschlichen, alternden, stinkenden, wunderbaren Körper."