philosophy-of-science

345 quotes
0 likes
0Verified
15Authors

Timeline

First Quote Added

April 10, 2026

Latest Quote Added

April 10, 2026

All Quotes

"Weirdly, although the beauty of physical theories is embodied in rigid mathematical structures based on simple underlying principles, the structures that have this sort of beauty tend to survive even when the underlying principles are found to be wrong. A good example is Dirac’s theory of the electron. Dirac in 1928 was trying to rework Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics in terms of particle waves so that it would be consistent with the special theory of relativity. This effort led Dirac to the conclusions that the electron must have a certain spin, and that the universe is filled with unobservable electrons of negative energy, whose absence at a particular point would be seen in the laboratory as the presence of an electron with the opposite charge, that is, an antiparticle of the electron. His theory gained an enormous prestige from the 1932 discovery in cosmic rays of precisely such an antiparticle of the electron, the particle now called the positron. Dirac’s theory was a key ingredient in the version of quantum electrodynamics that was developed and applied with great success in the 1930s and 1940s. But we know today that Dirac’s point of view was largely wrong. […] Yet the mathematics of Dirac’s theory has survived as an essential part of quantum field theory; it must be taught in every graduate course in advanced quantum mechanics. The formal structure of Dirac’s theory has thus survived the death of the principles of relativistic wave mechanics that Dirac followed in being led to his theory. So the mathematical structures that physicists develop in obedience to physical principles have an odd kind of portability. They can be carried over from one conceptual environment to another and serve many different purposes, like the clever bones in your shoulders that in another animal would be the joint between the wing and the body of a bird or the flipper and body of a dolphin. We are led to these beautiful structures by physical principles, but the beauty sometimes survives when the principles themselves do not."

- Structuralism (philosophy of science)

0 likesphilosophy-of-science
"There never was a sounder logical maxim of scientific procedure than Ockham's razor: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. That is to say; before you try a complicated hypothesis, you should make quite sure that no simplification of it will explain the facts equally well. No matter if it takes fifty generations of arduous experimentation to explode the simpler hypothesis, and no matter how incredible it may seem that that simpler hypothesis should suffice, still fifty generations are nothing in the life of science, which has all time before it; and in the long run, say in some thousands of generations, time will be economized by proceeding in an orderly manner, and by making it an invariable rule to try the simpler hypothesis first. Indeed, one can never be sure that the simpler hypothesis is not the true one, after all, until its cause has been fought out to the bitter end. But you will mark the limitation of my approval of Ockham's razor. It is a sound maxim of scientific procedure. If the question be what one ought to believe, the logic of the situation must take other factors into account. Speaking strictly, belief is out of place in pure theoretical science, which has nothing nearer to it than the establishment of doctrines, and only the provisional establishment of them, at that. Compared with living belief it is nothing but a ghost. If the captain of a vessel on a lee shore in a terrific storm finds himself in a critical position in which he must instantly either put his wheel to port acting on one hypothesis, or put his wheel to starboard acting on the contrary hypothesis, and his vessel will infallibly be dashed to pieces if he decides the question wrongly, Ockham's razor is not worth the stout belief of any common seaman. For stout belief may happen to save the ship, while Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem would be only a stupid way of spelling Shipwreck. Now in matters of real practical concern we are all in something like the situation of that sea-captain."

- Occam's razor

0 likesphilosophy-of-science
"The riddle of induction can be put thus: What rational basis is there for any of our beliefs about the unobserved? The theory of personal probability touches on the domain of the riddle and can even be construed as giving a partial answer. The theory prescribes, presumably compellingly, exactly how a set of beliefs should change in the light of what is observed. It can help you say, "My opinions today are the rational consequence of what they were yesterday and of what I have seen since yesterday." In principle, yesterday's opinions can be traced to the day before, but even given a coherent demigod able to trace his present opinions back to those with which he was born and to what he has experienced since, the theory of personal probability does not pretend to say with what system of opinions he ought to have been born. It leaves him, just as Hume would say, without rational foundation for his beliefs of today. Can there be any such foundation? The theory as such is silent, but I am led by study of it to doubt that there is a rational basis for what we believe about the unobserved. In fact, Hume's arguments, and modern variants of them such as Goodman's discussion of 'bleen' and 'grue', appeal to me as correct and realistic. That all my beliefs are but my personal opinions, no matter how well some of them may coincide with opinions of others, seems to me not a paradox but a truism. The grandiose image of a demigod tracing his beliefs back to the cradle only to find an impasse there seems a valid metaphor. If there is rational basis for beliefs going beyond mere coherency, then there are some specific opinions that a rational baby demigod must have. Put that way, the notion of any such basis seems to me quite counterintuitive."

- Problem of induction

0 likesepistemologyphilosophy-of-science
"The word chemistry, in Greek should be wrote χημια, and in Latin and English chemia and chemistry; not as usual, chymia and chymistry. The first author in whom the word is found is Plutarch, who lived under the Emperors ', ', and '. That philosopher, in his treatise of ' and ', takes occasion to observe that Egypt, in the sacred dialect of the country, was called by the same name as the black of the eye viz., χημια—by which he seems to intimate that the word chemia in the Egyptian language signified black, and that the country, Egypt, might take its denomination from the blackness of the soil. ...Instead of black, some will have it originally denote secret, or occult; and hence derive it from the Hebrew chaman, or '—a mystery, whose radix is cham. And, accordingly, Plutarch observes that Egypt, in the same sacred dialect, is sometimes wrote in Greek χαμια—chamia; whence the word is easily deduced further from Cham, eldest son of Noah, by whom Egypt was first peopled after the deluge, and from whom, in the Scripture style, it is called the land of Cham, or Chem. Now, that chaman, or haman, properly signifies secret appears from the same Plutarch, who, mentioning an ancient author named Menethes Sibonita, who had asserted that Amman and Hammon were used to denote the god of Egypt, Plutarch takes this occasion to observe that in the Egyptian language anything secret or occult was called by the same name, αμμον—Hammon... Lastly, the learned Bochart, keeping to the same sense of the word, chooses to derive it from the Arabic chema, or kema—to hide; adding that there is an Arabic book of secrets called by the same name Kemi."

- History of chemistry

0 likesphilosophy-of-sciencehistory-of-chemistry