Integers

113 quotes found

"Qvidam posuit unum par cuniculorum in quodam loco, qui erat undique pariete circundatus, ut sciret, quot ex eo paria germinarentur in uno anno: cum natura eorum sit per singulum mensem aliud par germinare; et in secundo mense ab eorum natiuitate germinant. Quia suprascriptum par in primo mense germinat, duplicabis ipsum, erunt paria duo in uno mense. Ex quibus unum, scilicet primum, in secundo mense geminat; et sic sunt in secundo mense paria 3 ; ex quibus in uno mense duo pregnantur; et geminantur in tercio mense paria 2 coniculorum ; et sic sunt paria 5 in ipso mense; ex quibus in ipso pregnantur paria 3; et sunt in quarto mense paria 8; ex quibus paria 5 geminant alia paria 5: quibus additis cum parijs 8, faciunt paria 13 in quinto mense; ex quibus paria 5, que geminata fuerunt in ipso mense, non concipiunt in ipso mense, sed alia 8 paria pregnantur; et sic sunt in sexto mense paria 21; cum quibus additis parijs 13, que geminantur in septimo , erunt in ipso paria 34 ; cum quibus additis parijs 21, que geminantur in octauo mense, erunt in ipso paria 55; cum quibus additis parjis 34, que geminantur in nono mense, erunt in ipso paria 89; cum quibus additis rursum parijs 55, que geminantur in decimo mense 144; cum quibus additis rursum parijs 89, que geminantur in undecimo mense, erunt in ipso paria 233. Cum quibus etiam additis parijs 144 , que geminantur in ultimo mense, erunt paria 377; et tot paria peperit suprascriptum par in prefato loco in capite unius anni. Potes enim uidere in hac margine, qualiter hoc operati fuimus, scilicet quod iunximus primum numerum cum secundo, uidelicet 1 cum 2; et secundum cum tercio; et tercium cum quarto; et quartum cum quinto, et sic deinceps, donec iunximus decimum cum undecimo, uidelicet 144 cum 233; et habuimus suprascriptorum cuniculorum summam, uidelicet 377 ; et sic posses facere per ordinem de infinitis numeris mensibus."

- Fibonacci numbers

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"We find also the Famous ', Mathematician to the Prince of Orange, having defined Number to be, That by which is explained the quantity of every Thing, he becomes so highly inflamed against those that will not have the Unit to be a Number, as to exclaim against Rhetoric, as if he were upon some solid Argument. True it is that he intermixes in his Discourses a question of some Importance, that is, whether a Unit be to Number, as a Point is to a Line. But here he should have made a distinction, to avoid the confusing together of two different things. To which end these two questions were to have been treated apart; whether a Unit be Number, and whether a Unit be to Number, as a Point is to a Line; and then to the first he should have said, that it was only a Dispute about a Word, and that an Unit was, or was not a Number, according to the Definition, which a Man would give to Number. That according to Euclid's Definition of Number; Number is a Multitude of Units assembled together: it was visible, that a Unit was no Number. But in regard this Definition of Euclid was arbitrary, and that it was lawful to give another Definition of Number, Number might be defined as Stevin defines it, according to which Definition a Unit is a Number; so that by what has been said, the first question is resolved, and there is nothing farther to be alleged against those that denied the Unit to be a Number, without a manifest begging of the question, as we may see by examining the pretended Demonstrations of Stevin. The first is, The Part is of the same Nature with the whole, The Unit is a Part of a Multitude of Units, Therefore the Unit is of the same Nature with a MuItitude of Units, and consequently of Number. This Argument is of no validity. For though the part were always of the same nature with the whole, it does not follow that it ought to have always the same name with the whole; nay it often... has not the same Name. A Soldier is part of an Army, and yet is no Army... a Half-Circle is no Circle... if we would we could not... give to Unit more than its name of Unit or part of Number. The Second Argument which Stevin produces is of no more force. If then the Unit were not a Number, Subtracting one out of three, the Number given would remain, which is absurd. But... to make it another Number than what was given, there needs no more than to subtract a Number from it, or a part of a Number, which is the Unit. Besides, if this Argument were good, we might prove in the same manner, that by taking a half Circle from a Circle given, the Circle given would remain, because no Circle is taken away. ... But the second Question, Whether an Unit be to Number, as a Point is to a Line, is a dispute concerning the thing? For it is absolutely false, that an Unit is to number as a point is to a Line. Since an Unit added to number makes it bigger, but a Line is not made bigger by the addition of a point. The Unit is a part of Number, but a Point is no part of a Line. An Unit being subtracted from a Number, the Number given does not remain; but a point being taken from a Line, the Line given remains. Thus doth Stevin frequently wrangle about the Definition of words, as when he perplexes himself to prove that Number is not a quantity discreet, that Proportion of Number is always Arithmetical, and not Geometrical, that the Root of what Number soever, is a Number, which shews us that he did not properly understand the definition of words, and that he mistook the definition of words, which were disputable, for the definition of things that were beyond all Controversy."

- 1 (number)

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"What Science can be more accurate than Geometry? What Science can afford Principles more evident, more certain, yea I will add, more simple than Geometrical Axioms, or exercises a more strictly accurate Logic in drawing its Conclusions? But Aristotle and ' affirm that Unity (they had more rightly said Numbers) the Principle of Arithmetic, is more simple than a Point which is the Principle of Geometry, or rather of Magnitude. Because a Point implies Position, but Unity does not. A Point, says Aristotle, and Unity are not to be divided, as Quantity: Unity requires no Position, a Point does. But this Comparison of a Point in Geometry with Unity in Arithmetic is of all the most unsufferable, and derives the worst Consequences upon Mathematical Learning. For Unity answers really to some Part of every Magnitude, but not to a Point: Thus if a Line be divided into six equal Parts, as the whole Line answers to the Number six, so every sixth Part answers to Unity, but not to a Point which is no Part of this Right Line. A Point is rightly termed Indivisible, not Unity. (For how ex. gr. can \frac{2}{6} + \frac{4}{6} equal Unity, if Unity be indivisible, and incomposed, and represent a Point) but rather only Unity is properly divisible, and Numbers arise from the Division of Unity. A Geometrical Point is much better compared to a Cypher or Arithmetical Nothing, which is really the Bound of every Number, coming between it and the Numbers next following, but not as a Part. A Cypher being added to or taken from a Number does neither encrease nor diminish it; from it is taken the Beginning of Computation, while itself is not computed; and it bears a manifest Relation to the principal Properties of a Geometrical Point. Nor is that altogether unexceptionable, which is said of Position; for a Point taken universally is not less indeterminate, and void of Position, than Unity taken the same Way: But Unity taken particularly implies a definite Position, and all other particular Circumstances, as well as a particular Point. Lastly, the Accuracy of Arithmetic and Geometry is so far from being different that it is altogether the same, drawn from the same Principles, and employed about the same Things. I might here annex many Observations and Consequences drawn from hence; but Not to be too tedious and prolix, I judge it will appear plain enough to every one who duly weighs what I have suggested, that, in reality, Number (at least that treated of by Mathematicians) differs nothing from continued Magnitude it self, nor seems to have any other Properties (Composition, Division, Proportion, and the like) than either from, or in respect to it, as it represents, or supplies its Place; nor consequently that it is any Species of Quantity distinct from Magnitude, or the Object of any Science but Geometry (which is conversant about Magnitude in general): In sum, that Number includes in it every Consideration pertaining to Geometry. Therefore the Element Writer (whatsoever Ramus can object, who taunts him with that Name) did not unadvisedly, in inserting Arithmetical Speculations among the Elements of Geometry, nay rather he did great Service to the Mathematics, and merited highly in not permitting these Sciences to be separated from one another, as if they were separate in Nature, but assigning to Arithmetic a suitable Place in Geometry."

- 1 (number)

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"I will now say something which may perhaps astonish you; it refers to the possibility of dividing a line into its infinitely small elements by following the same order which one employs in dividing the same line into forty, sixty, or a hundred parts, that is, by dividing it into two, four, etc. He who thinks that, by following this method, he can reach an infinite number of points is greatly mistaken; for if this process were followed to eternity there would still remain finite parts which were undivided. ... Indeed by such a method one is very far from reaching the goal of indivisibility; on the contrary he recedes from it and while he thinks that, by continuing this division and by multiplying the multitude of parts, he will approach infinity, he is... getting farther and farther away from it. My reason is this. In the preceding discussion we concluded that, in an infinite number, it is necessary that the squares and cubes should be as numerous as the totality of the natural numbers [tutti i numeri], because both of these are as numerous as their roots which constitute the totality of the natural numbers. Next we saw that the larger the numbers taken the more sparsely distributed were the squares, and still more sparsely the cubes; therefore it is clear that the larger the numbers to which we pass the farther we recede from the infinite number; hence it follows that since this process carries us farther and farther from the end sought, if on turning back we shall find that any number can be said to be infinite, it must be unity. Here indeed are satisfied all those conditions which are requisite for an infinite number; I mean that unity contains in itself as many squares as there are cubes and natural numbers [tutti i numeri]. ... There is no difficulty in the matter because unity is at once a square, a cube, a square of a square, and all the other powers [dignitā]; nor is there any essential peculiarity in squares or cubes which does not belong to unity; as, for example, the property of two square numbers that they have between them a mean proportional; take any square number you please as the first term and unity for the other, then you will always find a number which is a mean proportional. Consider the two square numbers, 9 and 4; then 3 is the mean proportional between 9 and 1 [\frac{1}{3} = \frac{3}{9}]; while 2 is a mean proportional between 4 and 1 [\frac{1}{2} = \frac{2}{4}]; between 9 and 4 we have 6 as a mean proportional [\frac{4}{6} = \frac{6}{9}]. A property of cubes is that they must have between them two mean proportional numbers; take 8 and 27; between them lie 12 and 18 [\frac{8}{12} = \frac{18}{27}]; while between 1 and 8 we have 2 and 4 intervening [\frac{1}{2} = \frac{4}{8}]; and between 1 and 27 there lie 3 and 9 [\frac{1}{3} = \frac{9}{27}]. Therefore we conclude that unity is the only infinite number. These are some of the marvels which our imagination cannot grasp and which should warn us against the serious error of those who attempt to discuss the infinite by assigning to it the same properties which we employ for the finite, the natures of the two having nothing in common."

- 1 (number)

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"Those numbers... independent of the particular things which happen to undergo counting—of what are these... ? To pose this question means to raise the problem of "scientific" arithmetic or logistic. ...we are no longer interested in the requirements of daily life ...now our concern is rather with understanding the very possibility of this activity, with understanding... that knowing is involved and that there must... be a corresponding being which possesses that permanence of condition which first makes it capable of being "known." But the soul's turning away from the things of daily life, the changing of the direction... the "conversion" and "turning about"... leads to a further question... What is required is an object which has a purely noetic character and which exhibits at the same time... the countable... This requirement is exactly fulfilled by the "pure" units, which are "nonsensual," accessible only to the understanding, indistinguishable from one another, and resistant to all participation. The "scientific" arithmetician and logistician deals with numbers of pure monads. And... Plato stresses emphatically that there is "no mean difference" between these and the ordinary numbers. ...Only a careful consideration of the fact... forces us into the further supposition that there must indeed be a special "nonsensual" material to which these numbers refer. The immense propaedeutic importance... within Platonic doctrine is immediately clear, for is not a continual effort made in this doctrine to exhibit as the true object of knowing that which is not accessible to the senses? Here we have indeed a "learning matter"... "capable of hauling [us] toward being". It forces the soul to study, by thought alone, the truth as it shows itself by itself. ...ability to count and to calculate presupposes the existence of "nonsensual" units. Thus an unlimited field of "pure" units presents itself to the view of the "scientific" arithemetician and logistician."

- 1 (number)

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"I come now to the capital work of Hilbert which he communicated to the Congress of Mathematicians at Heidelberg... of which...an English translation due to Halsted appeared in The Monist. ...the author's aim is analogous to that of Russell, but on many points he diverges from his predecessor. "But," he says, "on attentive consideration we become aware that in the usual exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental concepts of arithmetic are already employed; for example, the concept of the aggregate, in part also the concept of number. "We fall thus into a vicious circle and therefore to avoid paradoxes a partly simultaneous development of the laws of logic and arithmetic is requisite." ...what Hilbert says of the principles of logic in the usual exposition applies likewise to the logic of Russell. So for Russell logic is prior to arithmetic; for Hilbert they are 'simultaneous.' We shall find... other differences still greater... I prefer to follow step by step the development of Hilbert's thought... "Let us take as the basis of our consideration first of all a thought-thing 1 (one)." Notice that in so doing we in no wise imply the notion of number, because it is understood that 1 is here only a symbol and that we do not at all seek to know its meaning. "The taking of this thing together with itself respectively two, three or more times ..." Ah! this time it is no longer the same; if we introduce the words 'two,' 'three,' and above all 'more,' 'several,' we introduce the notion of number; and then the definition of finite whole number which we shall presently find, will come too late. Our author was too circumspect not to perceive this begging of the question. So at the end of his work he tries to proceed to a truly patching-up process. Hilbert then introduces two simple objects 1 and =, and and considers all the combinations of these two objects, all the combinations of their combinations, etc. It goes without saying that we must forget the ordinary meaning of these two signs and not attribute any to them. Afterwards he separates these combinations into two classes, the class of the existent and the class of the non-existent... entirely arbitrary. Every affirmative statement tells us that a certain combination belongs to the class of the existent; every negative statement tells us that a certain combination belongs to the class of the non-existent. Note now a difference of the highest importance. For Russell any object whatsoever, which he designates by x, is an object absolutely undetermined and about which he supposes nothing; for Hilbert it is one of the combinations formed with the symbols 1 and =; he could not conceive of the introduction of anything other than combinations of objects already defined. ... Russell is faithful to his point of view, which is that of comprehension. He starts from the general idea of being, and enriches it more and more while restricting it, by adding new qualities. Hilbert on the contrary recognizes as possible beings only combinations of objects already known; so that (looking at only one side of his thought) we might say he takes the viewpoint of extension."

- 1 (number)

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"But for the present we desire to contemplate, if possible, the nature of the pure and true one, which is not one from another, but from itself alone. It is therefore here requisite, to transfer ourselves on all sides to one itself, without adding any thing to its nature, and to acquiesce entirely in its contemplation; being careful lest we should wander from him in the least, and fall from one into two. But if we are less cautious we shall contemplate two, nor in the two possess the one itself; for they are both posterior to unity. And one will not suffer itself to be numerated with another, nor indeed to be numbered at all: for it is a measure free from all mensuration. Nor is it equal to any others, so as to agree with them in any particular, or it would inherit something in common with its connumerated natures; and thus this common something, would be superior to one though this is utterly impossible. Hence neither essential number, nor number posterior to this, which properly pertains to quantity can be predicated of one: not essential number whose essence always consists in intellection; nor that which regards quantity, since it embraces unity, together with other things different from one. For the nature pertaining to number which is inherent in quantity, imitating the nature essential to prior numbers, and looking back upon true unity, procures its own essence neither dispersing nor dividing unity, but while it becomes the duad, the one remains prior to the duad, and is different from both the unities comprehended by the duad, and from each apart. For why should the duad be unity itself? Or one unity of the duad rather than another, be one itself? If then neither both together, nor each apart is unity itself, certainly unity which is the origin of all number, is different from all these; and while it truly abides, seems after a manner not to abide. But how are those unities different from the one? And how is the duad in a certain respect one? And again, is it the same one, which is preserved in the comprehension of each unity? Perhaps it must be said that both unities, participate of the first unity, but are different from that which they participate: and that the duad so far as it is a certain one participates of one itself, yet not every where after the same manner: for an army, and a house are not similarly one; since these when compared with continued quantity, are not one, either with respect to essence, or quantity. Are then the unities in the pentad, differently related to one, from those in the decad? But is the one contained in the pentad, the same with the one in the decad? Perhaps also if the whole of a small ship, is compared with the whole of a large one, a city to a city, and an army to an army, there will be in these the same one. But if not in the first instance, neither in these. However, if any farther doubts remain, we must leave them to a subsequent discussion."

- 1 (number)

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"In the tenth book Euclid deals with certain irrational magnitudes; and since the Greeks possessed no symbolism for surds, he was forced to adopt a geometrical representation. Propositions 1 to 21 deal generally with incommensurable magnitudes. The rest of the book, namely, propostions 22 to 117, is devoted to the discussion of every possible variety of lines which can be represented by \sqrt{(\sqrt{a} \pm \sqrt{b})}, where a and b denote commensurable lines. There are twenty-five species of such lines, and that Euclid could detect and classify them all is in the opinion of so competent an authority as Nesselmann the most striking illustration of his genius. No further advance in the theory of incommensurable magnitudes was made until the subject was taken up by Leonardo and Cardan after the interval of more than a thousand years. In the last proposition of the tenth book [prop. 117] the side and diagonal of a square are proved to be incommensurable. The proof is so short and easy that I may quote it. If possible let the side be to the diagonal in a commensurable ratio, namely, that of two integers, a and b. Suppose this ratio reduced to its lowest terms so that a and b have no common divisor other than unity, that is, they are prime to one another. Then (by Euc. I, 47) b^2 = 2a^2; therefore b^2 is an even number; therefore b is an even number; hence, since a is prime to b, a must be an odd number. Again, since it has been shown that b is an even number, b may be represented by 2n; therefore (2n)^2 = 2a^2; therefore a^2 = (2n)^2; therefore a^2 is an even number; therefore a is an even number. Thus the same number a must be both odd and even, which is absurd; therefore the side and the diagonal are incommensurable. Hankel believes that this proof is due to Pythagoras, and this is not unlikely. This proposition is also proved in another way in Euc. X, 9, and for this and other reasons it is now usually believed to be an interpolation by some commentator on the Elements."

- Prime number

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"The tree that thou sawest, which grew, and was strong, whose height reached unto the heaven, and the sight thereof to all the earth; Whose leaves were fair, and the fruit thereof much, and in it was meat for all; under which the beasts of the field dwelt, and upon whose branches the fowls of the heaven had their habitation: It is thou, O king, that art grown and become strong: for thy greatness is grown, and reacheth unto heaven, and thy dominion to the end of the earth. And whereas the king saw a watcher and an holy one coming down from heaven, and saying, Hew the tree down, and destroy it; yet leave the stump of the roots thereof in the earth, even with a band of iron and brass, in the tender grass of the field; and let it be wet with the dew of heaven, and let his portion be with the beasts of the field, till seven times pass over him; This is the interpretation, O king, and this is the decree of the most High, which is come upon my lord the king: That they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will. And whereas they commanded to leave the stump of the tree roots; thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee, after that thou shalt have known that the heavens do rule. Wherefore, O king, let my counsel be acceptable unto thee, and break off thy sins by righteousness, and thine iniquities by shewing mercy to the poor; if it may be a lengthening of thy ."

- 7 (number)

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"The folly of Interpreters has been, to foretell times and things by this Prophecy, as if God designed to make them Prophets. By this rashness they have not only exposed themselves, but brought the Prophecy also into contempt. The design of God was much otherwise. He gave this and the Prophecies of the Old Testament, not to gratify men's curiosities by enabling them to foreknow things, but that after they were fulfilled they might be interpreted by the event, and his own Providence, not the Interpreters, be then manifested thereby to the world. For the event of things predicted many ages before, will then be a convincing argument that the world is governed by providence. For, as the few and obscure Prophecies concerning Christ’s first coming were for setting up the Christian religion, which all nations have since corrupted; so the many and clear Prophecies concerning the things to be done at Christ’s second coming, are not only for predicting but also for effecting a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth, and setting up a kingdom wherein dwells righteousness. The event will prove the Apocalypse; and this Prophecy, thus proved and understood, will open the old Prophets, and all together will make known the true religion, and establish it. For he that will understand the old Prophets, must begin with this; but the time is not yet come for understanding them perfectly, because the main revolution predicted in them is not yet come to pass. In the days of the voice of the seventh Angel, when he shall begin to sound, the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the Prophets: and then the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and his Christ, and he shall reign for ever, Apoc. x. 7. xi. 15. There is already so much of the Prophecy fulfilled, that as many as will take pains in this study, may see sufficient instances of God’s providence: but then the signal revolutions predicted by all the holy Prophets, will at once both turn men’s eyes upon considering the predictions, and plainly interpret them. Till then we must content ourselves with interpreting what hath been already fulfilled. Amongst the Interpreters of the last age there to scarce one of note who hath not made some discovery worth knowing; and thence I seem to gather that God is about opening these mysteries. The success of others put me upon considering it; and if I have done any thing which may be useful to following writers, I have my design."

- 7 (number)

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