Communist Party of the Soviet Union members

269 quotes found

"In 1964, his colleagues deposed Khrushchev: the establishment had grown weary of his restless activity and yearned, in the words of his son, “for calm and stability.” His place was taken by Leonid Brezhnev, who would serve as first secretary for eighteen years, even though late in life he showed distinct signs of senility: the machine simply ground on. Year by year, the Soviet regime decayed. The economy stagnated, falling ever more behind those of the advanced industrial countries. With fear of draconian punishment gone, workers had little incentive to exert themselves: as they cynically explained, “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.” Workers who showed zeal risked being accused by their colleagues of “provocation” and roughed up. The central planning apparatus concentrated on doing what it knew best: turning out the same goods and in the process missing out on such innovations as plastics, synthetic fibers, and, above all, computers. Insistence on tight control of information meant that the USSR did not participate in advances in information technology, which revolutionized Western economies. The living standards of ordinary citizens, though better than in Stalin’s day, fell below even the low minimal norms set by the state: thus in the late 1980s, nearly one-half of the Soviet population earned less than ten dollars a month. Drunkenness was endemic: the Soviet Union could boast the highest rate of alcohol consumption in the world, as well as the highest rate of alcoholic deaths. Nothing illustrated better the ebbing vitality of its citizens than demographic statistics: the population, which under tsarism had grown at the most rapid rate in Europe, by the 1970s showed a deficit, as more Russians (and Ukrainians) died each year than were born."

- Leonid Brezhnev

0 likesGeneral Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersHeads of stateLenin Peace Prize recipientsPeople of the Cold War
"The ultimate beneficiary of Nixon’s summitry was Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet party leader had staked his bid for outright leadership on a policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. That made sense for economic and defense reasons, not to mention the looming threat from China. In the spring of 1972 Brezhnev let nothing, not even the American mining of North Vietnam, get in the way of a summit. The arms control agreements signed in Moscow in May silenced his critics and apparently confirmed the Soviet Union’s equality with the United States. The statement of Basic Principles also suggested that the Americans were accepting détente on Soviet terms. Had Nixon remained potent in the second term he might have held the Kremlin to account, as he believed had not been done after Yalta. Instead his crumbling presidency gave the Soviets and their allies an increasingly free hand to act as they pleased. By the middle of 1975 communist forces controlled all of Indochina. Over the next few years the Soviets extended their influence in eastern and southern Africa, in ways that fitted their understanding of détente— a world made safe for class struggle—but also undermined support for the process in the United States. In 1976 Gerald Ford, Nixon’s successor, banned the word “détente” from the official diplomatic lexicon. Nixon’s failure, in other words, relegated not merely summitry but diplomacy to the back burner. Dialogue with Moscow atrophied. And after the Brezhnev Politburo sent troops into Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Soviet-American relations degenerated into what was dubbed a “new cold war.”"

- Leonid Brezhnev

0 likesGeneral Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersHeads of stateLenin Peace Prize recipientsPeople of the Cold War
"This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia our people’s reply was war for the fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom. It will be the same with Hitler, who in his arrogance has proclaimed a new crusade against our country. The Red Army and our whole people will again wage victorious war for the fatherland, for our country, for honor, for liberty. The government of the Soviet Union expresses the firm conviction that the whole population of our country, all workers, peasants and intellectuals, men and women, will conscientiously perform their duties and do their work. Our entire people must now stand solid and united as never before. Each one of us must demand of himself and of others discipline, organization and self-denial worthy of real Soviet patriots, in order to provide for all the needs of the Red Army, Navy and Air Force, to insure victory over the enemy. The government calls upon you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally still more closely around our glorious Bolshevist party, around our Soviet Government, around our great leader and comrade, Stalin. Ours is a righteous cause. The enemy shall be defeated. Victory will be ours."

- Vyacheslav Molotov

0 likesSoviet premiersMinisters of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Soviet UnionAmbassadors of Russia and the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersRussian communists
"Why did Churchill, so hard-headed about Hitler, maintain such illusions about Stalin’s tractability? In large part it was because the two dictators were viewed very differently in the West. In contrast with the plenitude of information available on Nazi Germany in the 1930s, the Soviet regime had remained virtually a closed book during this period. Diplomatic staff had minimal opportunity for contacts with Russian officials, let alone the ordinary population. Even ambassadors rarely met Stalin; they dealt with his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, renowned as a hard-faced “Mr. Nyet.” Moreover the Soviet press provided virtually no useful political intelligence, in stark contrast with the media in Washington, which offered endless insights into the White House and Capitol Hill. Churchill spoke aptly in 1939 of Soviet policy as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Then suddenly the Soviets needed outside help and the doors to the Kremlin were flung open. In the second half of 1941, Roosevelt’s emissaries Harry Hopkins and Averell Harriman and Churchill’s right-hand men Max Beaverbrook and Anthony Eden all spent hours with Stalin. Churchill met him for extended summits on five occasions, joined by Roosevelt for two of them."

- Vyacheslav Molotov

0 likesSoviet premiersMinisters of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Soviet UnionAmbassadors of Russia and the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersRussian communists
"You know, comrades, that Konstantin Ustinovich has been gravely ill for a long time, and has been in the hospital in recent months. On the part of the Fourth Main Department, all necessary measures were taken in order to treat Konstantin Ustinovich. But the illness did not submit to the cure, it started to weaken his systems first slowly, and then faster and faster. It became especially aggravated as a result of pneumonia in both lungs, which Konstantin Ustinovich developed during his vacation in Kislovodsk. There were periods when we succeeded in alleviating the lung and heart insufficiencies, and during those periods Konstantin Ustinovich found enough strength to come to work. Several times he conducted Politburo sessions, and put in work days, although shortened ones. Emphysema of the lungs and the aggravated lung and heart insufficiency had worsened significantly in the last two or three weeks. Another, accompanying illness had developed—chronic hepatitis, i.e. liver failure with its transformation into cirrhosis. The cirrhosis of the liver and the worsening dystrophic changes in the organs and tissues led to the situation where not with standing intensive therapy, which was administered actively on a daily basis, the state of his health gradually deteriorated. On March 10 at 3:00 p.m., Konstantin Ustinovich lost consciousness, and at 19:20 death occurred as a result of heart failure."

- Konstantin Chernenko

0 likesGeneral Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionHeads of stateCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersAtheists from RussiaPeople of the Cold War
"The dilemma between satisfying workers' pent up demands and defending the socialist state was precisely the challenge of the new Soviet leadership after Stalin. The group that had come to power—Georgii Malenkov as premier, Lavrentii Beriia as head of the secret police, Nikita Khrushchev as party first secretary, Viacheslav Molotov as foreign minister, Nikolai Bulganin as defense minister—feared the collapse of Communist rule as much as they feared and distrusted each other. Through his brutality and the respect he commanded, Stalin had been the guarantor of Communist rule and the final adjudicator of all things political. With him gone, his Kremlin successors all agreed that tension had to be reduced and compromises found if the Soviet state and its alliances were not to be seriously threatened. The first signal of new policies was the sudden release of the Jewish doctors arrested by Stalin, who were accused of trying to murder him and other Soviet leaders. Beriia, as the former head of the secret police, may have tried to cover his own tracks by announcing that this and other cases were violations of “socialist legality.” Unnerved by Beriia’s vigorous involvement in policy-making, the other leaders conspired against him, and he was arrested in July 1953 and executed by the end of the year. According to several witnesses, General Pavel Batitskii, the commander of the Moscow Air Defense Region, shot the most feared man in Russia through the head at close range when he would not willingly walk to the execution ground."

- Lavrentiy Beria

0 likesMilitary leaders from RussiaPoliticians from the Soviet UnionInterior ministersPeople from Georgia (country)Communist Party of the Soviet Union members
"Decided on by NATO ministers on 12 December 1979, in response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, and despite considerable West German division and reluctance, the Cruise and Pershing missiles arrived from November 1983. Their deployment demonstrated the continued strength and effectiveness of the Western alliance. In addition, American rhetoric, notably Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech, which in some respects matched a longstanding Soviet pattern in rhetoric, rankled the Soviet leaders. Moreover, the American invasion of the unstable, left-wing Caribbean island of Grenada in October 1983 accentuated Soviet concern about American actions and intentions. Yuri Andropov, the Soviet leader from 1982 to 1984, interpreted these actions to support his suspicions of the USA, and he suspended Soviet participation in the arms-control talks in Geneva. Andropov came out of Gosbes (State Security) and was a genuine ideologue. He believed in the inherent mendacity of Western imperialist leaders and society, and in imperialists’ treachery and willingness to wage war against the Soviet Union. However, there was no precipitant to conflict, in part due to Soviet caution and in part because the Soviet Union could not afford war."

- Yuri Andropov

0 likesGeneral Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersAmbassadors of Russia and the Soviet UnionPoliticians from the Soviet UnionPeople of the Cold War
"A second escape from determinism involved the discrediting of dictatorships. Tyrants had been around for thousands of years; but George Orwell's great fear, while writing 1984 on his lonely island in 1948, was that the progress made in restraining them in the 18th and 19th centuries had been reversed. Despite the defeats of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, it would have been hard to explain the first half of the 20th century without concluding that the currents of history had come to favor authoritarian politics and collectivist economics. Like Irish monks at the edge of their medieval world, Orwell at the edge of his was seeking to preserve what little was left of civilization by showing what a victory of the barbarians would mean. Big Brothers controlled the Soviet Union, China, and half of Europe by the time 1984 came out. It would have been Utopian to expect that they would stop there. But they did: the historical currents during the second half of the 20th century turned decisively against communism. Orwell himself had something to do with this: his anguished writings, together with the later and increasingly self-confident ones of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Havel, and the future pope Karol Wojtyla, advanced a moral and spiritual critique of Marxism-Leninism for which it had no answer. It took time for these sails to catch wind and for these rudders to take hold, but by the late 1970s they had begun to do so. John Paul II and the other actor-leaders of the 1980s then set the course. The most inspirational alternatives the Soviet Union could muster were Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, a clear sign that dictatorships were not what they once had been."

- Yuri Andropov

0 likesGeneral Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCommunist Party of the Soviet Union membersAmbassadors of Russia and the Soviet UnionPoliticians from the Soviet UnionPeople of the Cold War
"Lenin was transformed. I was deeply impressed by that concentrated energy with which he spoke, by those piercing eyes of his which grew almost sombre as they bored gimlet-like into the audience, by the orator’s monotonous but compelling movements, by that fluent diction so redolent of will-power. I realized that as a tribune this man was destined to make a powerful and ineradicable mark. And I already knew the extent of Lenin’s strength as a publicist – his unpolished but extraordinarily clear style, his ability to present any idea, however complicated, in astonishingly simple form and to modify it in such a way that it would ultimately be engraved upon any mind, however dull and however unaccustomed to political thinking. Only later, much later, did I come to see that Lenin’s greatest gifts were not those of a tribune or a publicist, not even those of a thinker, but even in those early days it was obvious to me that the dominating trait of his character, the feature which constituted half his make-up, was his will: an extremely firm, extremely forceful will capable of concentrating itself on the most immediate task but which yet never strayed beyond the radius traced out by his powerful intellect and which assigned every individual problem its place as a link in a huge, world-wide political chain."

- Anatoly Lunacharsky

0 likesPoliticians from the Soviet UnionEducation ministersMinisters of Russia and the Soviet UnionRevolutionariesCommunist Party of the Soviet Union members