Banking

165 quotes found

"The reason that the United States had a banking industry that was radically better for the economic prosperity of the country had nothing to do with differences in the motivation of those who owned the banks. Indeed, the profit motive, which underpinned the monopolistic nature of the banking industry in Mexico, was present in the United States, too. But this profit motive was channeled differently because of the radically different U.S. institutions. The bankers faced different economic institutions, institutions that subjected them to much greater competition. And this was largely because the politicians who wrote the rules for the bankers faced very different incentives themselves, forged by different political institutions. Indeed, in the late eighteenth century, shortly after the Constitution of the United States came into operation, a banking system looking similar to that which subsequently dominated Mexico began to emerge. Politicians tried to set up state banking monopolies, which they could give to their friends and partners in exchange for part of the monopoly profits. The banks also quickly got into the business of lending money to the politicians who regulated them, just as in Mexico. But this situation was not sustainable in the United States, because the politicians who attempted to create these banking monopolies, unlike their Mexican counterparts, were subject to election and reelection. Creating banking monopolies and giving loans to politicians is good business for politicians, if they can get away with it. It is not particularly good for the citizens, however. Unlike in Mexico, in the United States the citizens could keep politicians in check and get rid of ones who would use their offices to enrich themselves or create monopolies for their cronies. In consequence, the banking monopolies crumbled. The broad distribution of political rights in the United States, especially when compared to Mexico, guaranteed equal access to finance and loans. This in turn ensured that those with ideas and inventions could benefit from them."

- Banking

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"No observer has succeeded in pinpointing the spark that set off the roaring conflagration that swept and eventually consumed the securities markets in 1928 and 1929. Clearly, however, its sustaining oxygen was a matter not only of recondite market mechanisms and traders’ technicalities but also of simple atmospherics—specifically, the mood of speculative expectation that hung feverishly in the air and induced fantasies of effortless wealth that surpassed the dreams of avarice. Much blame has been leveled at a feckless Federal Reserve System for failing to tighten credit as the speculative fires spread, but while it is arguable that the easy-money policies of 1927 helped to kindle the blaze, the fact is that by late 1928 it had probably burned beyond controlling by orthodox financial measures. The Federal Reserve Board justifiably hesitated to raise its rediscount rate for fear of penalizing nonspeculative business borrowers. When it did impose a 6 percent rediscount rate in the late summer of 1929, call loans were commanding interest of close to 20 percent—a spread that the Fed could not have bridged without catastrophic damage to legitimate borrowers. Similarly, the board had early exhausted its already meager ability to soak up funds through open-market sales of government securities. By the end of 1928, the system’s inventory of such securities barely exceeded $200 million— a pittance compared to the nearly $8 billion in call loans then outstanding. By ordinary measures, in fact, credit was tight after 1928. Mere money was not at the root of the evil soon to befall Wall Street; men were—men, and women, whose lust for the fast buck had loosed all restraints of financial prudence or even common sense."

- Federal Reserve System

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"A fresh revolt of the Venetians resulted in an order... by the emperor to confiscate all their property... and to seize and imprison their persons. The doge... issued orders... to depart immediately. ...The emperor, in return... letting loose a fleet and waging a destructive war upon all the dependencies of Venice. The Venetians were aroused as never before... and in one hundred days... [o]ne hundred and thirty fully armed vessels sailed under the command of Doge Vitale Michieli II. The fleet departed for Dalmatia. Trau and Ragusa were taken and well-nigh destroyed, and the fleet sailed for the Archipelago. When off Negropont they were met by the governor, who persuaded the doge to send ambassadors to the emperor. These Venetian envoys were... detained all winter in prolix negotiations. In the meantime a... plague broke out among the fleet at ... and in the spring of 1173 a miserable remnant... of only seventeen vessels, made its way back to Venice, carrying with it the seeds of the plague. ...The imported pestilence spread itself over the city, sparing neither sex, age, nor condition; the populace accused the doge of being the author of these calamities, and when he appeared before the infuriated multitude he was murdered on the steps of the ducal palace. But out of all this misery and disorder arose a new order... Changes were made in the character of the government, limiting the powers of the doge, and Sebastiano Ziani was elected and installed in the ducal palace."

- History of banking

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"Britain was at war alternately on two fronts—first with the American colonies... then with Napoleon... Money was needed... Pitt was relentless... in his demands on the Bank for loans. Though taxes were increased... the need continued. ...Bank reserves dwindled, and there were occasional runs. Finally, in 1797, under conditions of great tension... the Bank suspended the right of redemption of its notes and deposits in gold and silver. The principal immediate consequence... disappearance of gold and silver coins... People passed on the notes and kept the metal. ...The Bank hurriedly printed one- and two-pound notes, and it also redeemed from its vaults a store of plundered Spanish pieces of eight. ...The needs of the government continued... Loans and the resulting note issues continued to increase. ...so did prices and the price of gold. ...[I]n reflection of the distribution of power... the concern was focused not on the price of food but on the price of gold. In... 1810, the House of Commons impaneled a committee... The committee... found... an overissue of the still irredeemable... notes [and] proposed that, after a two year period, the Bank make its notes fully convertible into specie once again. Thus... there could be no increase in the price of metal. There followed in 1811 a famous debate on the nature of money and its management... In the debate... is a difference of opinion that continues to this day. Where does economic change originate? Does it begin with those [in the banks] who are responsible for money... who made the loans and thus caused the supply of notes... to increase. (From this... the stimulating effect of rising prices on production and trade.) Or does change begin with production? ...with consequent effect on the demand for loans and thence on the supply of money? In short, does money influence the economy or does money respond to the economy? The question is still asked."

- History of banking

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"A greater danger to gold was war. The gold standard in the last century owed much to the intelligent management of the ... It owed much more to the British peace. In the next century warring governments would, as did that of Pitt, turn to their central banks for the money that they could not raise in taxes. And no bank, whatever its pretense to independence, would even think of resisting. Most dangerous of all would be democracy. The Bank of England was the instrument of a ruling class. Among the powers the Bank derived from the ruling class was that of inflicting hardship. It could lower prices and wages, increase unemployment. These were the correctives when gold was being lost; euphoria was excessive. Few or none foresaw that farmers and workers would one day have the power that would make governments unwilling to impose these hardships even in so righteous a cause as defense of the currency. However, it was early seen that the interests of the rich in these matters could differ from those of others. Writing in 1810, Ricardo [made that observation in a September 6 letter to the Morning Chronicle editor]... In England the triumph of Ricardo's monied class was complete or nearly so. In the United States, however, it was subject to the sharpest of challenges. In one form or another, this challenge was to dominate American politics for the first century and a half of the Republic. Only the politics of slavery would divide men more angrily than the politics of money."

- History of banking

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"The banks... provided the money that financed the speculation that in each case preceded the crash. Those buying land, commodities or railroad stocks and bonds came to the banks for loans. As the resulting notes and deposits went into circulation, they paid for the speculative purchases of yet others. It helped that the banks were small and local and thus could believe what the speculators believed... that values would go up for ever. The banking system... was well designed to expand the supply of money as speculation required. Banks and money also contributed to the ensuing crash. A farther constant of all the panics was that banks failed. In the earlier panics the will-of-the-wisp enterprises... disappeared... Later in the century, the casualties continued, and still most heavily among the small state banks. ...After 1920, the real slaughter began, and, after 1929, it approached euthanasia. In the four years beginning in 1930, more than 9000 banks and bankers hit the dust. A bank failure is not an ordinary business misadventure. ...Owners lose their capital and depositors their deposits, and both therewith lose their ability to purchase ...But failure (or... fear of failure) also means a shrinkage in the money supply. ...A healthy bank is making loans and, in consequence, creating deposits that, in turn, are money. A bank that fears failure is contracting its loans and therewith its deposits. And one that has failed is liquidating its loans, and its frozen deposits are no longer money. The liquidation also draws on the reserves, loans, deposits and thus the money supply of other banks."

- History of banking

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